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Abstract. Majority judgment (MJ) and approval voting (AV) are compared
in theory and practice. Criticisms of MJ and claims that AV is superior are
refuted.
The two primary criticisms have been that MJ is not “Condorcet-consistent”
and that it admits the “no-show” paradox. That MJ is not Condorcet-consistent
is a good property shared with AV: the domination paradox shows majority rule
may well err in an election between two. Whereas the no-show paradox is in
theory possible with MJ it is as a practical matter impossible. For those who
believe this extremely rare phenomenon is important it is proven that MJ with
three grades cannot admit the no-show paradox.
In contrast, AV suffers from serious drawbacks because voters can only “tick”
or “approve” candidates—at best only Approve or Disapprove each candidate.
With AV voters cannot express their opinions adequately; experiments show
that Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove; and although AV does not admit
the no-show paradox it admits the very closely allied “no-show syndrome” and
“insensitivity.”
Two is too few. Substantive debate must concern three or more grades.
Key words: Majority judgment, majority rule, approval voting, Condorcet-
consistency, domination paradox, no-show paradox, no-show syndrome.
Introduction
In 1925 Walter Lippmann, claimed by many to be the most influential journalist
of the twentieth century, pointed to an obvious yet fundamental limitation of the
majority rule (MR) as it is practiced in the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and most nations throughout the world:
“[W]hat in fact is an election? We call it an expression of the popular
will. But is it? We go into a polling booth and mark a cross on a
piece of paper for one of two, or perhaps three or four names. Have
we expressed our thoughts . . . ? Presumably we have a number of
thoughts on this and that with many buts and ifs and ors. Surely
the cross on a piece of paper does not express them. . . . [C]alling a
vote the expression of our mind is an empty fiction.” [25]
Approval Voting (AV)—first proposed in 1977 [41], soon thereafter rashly
proclaimed to become “the election reform of the twentieth century” [10]—has
been advanced as the method that for a variety of reasons will overcome the
limitations of MR [14, 11, 24]. It may be described as a method that asks
voters to assign one of two grades, Approve or Disapprove, to each candidate.
The electorate’s rank-order of the candidates is determined by the number of
Approves. While marking several crosses or ticks rather than the at most one of
MR—as AV-voters are typically asked to do—is slightly better than MR, calling
an AV-vote an expression of a voter’s mind is an empty fiction as well.
Majority Judgment (MJ) [1], proposed thirty years after AV [41]—a twenty-
first century idea—begins by confronting voters with a specific charge, such as
(in an election):
“Having taken into account all relevant considerations, I judge, in
conscience, that as President of the European Union each of the
following candidates would be:”
and then asks them to evaluate each candidate in a scale that contains any fixed,
finite number of ordinal grades such as
Outstanding, Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, Poor, To Reject.
Majorities determine the electorate’s evaluation of each candidate and the rank-
ing between every pair of candidates—yielding a transitive rank-ordering of all
candidates—with the first-placed among them the winner. MJ with more than
two grades—six or seven have proven to be good choices—certainly gives voters
a much greater ability to express their minds than does AV.
While some AV supporters admit that MJ allows “more nuanced judgments”
[11] they steadfastly maintain that AV is superior, advancing a variety of rea-
sons.
The first intent of this article is to present practical and theoretical evidence
to show that every one of those “reasons” is either wrong, insignificant, and/or
not realized in practice (and some, amusingly, are shared with AV). Among
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them—in addition to the lack of Condorcet-consistency [20] and the possibility
of the no-show paradox [8, 12, 16, 20]—are that it can elect a candidate pre-
ferred by only one voter [11], that it is a “tall order” because too difficult for
voters [12], that it induces strategic behavior because “I’m afraid, voters would
. . . [give] their favorites the maximum grade and their most serious competitors
the minimum grade” [12].
AV has been viewed, described, used, or analyzed in three different guises.
(1) It was originally conceived and analyzed in terms of the traditional
paradigm of social choice theory, namely, that voters compare candidates: im-
plicitly voters rank candidates and draw a line between those who receive a tick
or cross and those who do not.1 With this view changes in the slate of can-
didatures could induce voters to change their rankings (resulting, for example,
from a change in the number of ticks), so with it AV does not escape from Ar-
row’s impossibility theorem (its advocates made no such claim until it became
apparent that AV could be viewed differently).
(2) It has been used as though it were a point-summing method with a
tick or cross worth 1 point. Thus, for example, the Social Choice and Welfare
Society’s ballot for electing its president had small boxes next to candidates’
names with the instructions: “You can vote for any number of candidates by
ticking the appropriate boxes,” the number of ticks determining the candidates’
order of finish. No meaning is ascribed to Approve other than it gives 1 point
and a candidate’s point total determines the order-of-finish (giving no point is
in no way identified with Disapprove). It is entirely up to voters to decide how
to try to express their opinions.
(3) After MJ became known a new view emerged: “the idea of judging each
and every candidate as acceptable or not is fundamentally different” from either
voting for a candidate or ranking them ([11], pp.vii-viii). This suggests a belief
that voters are able to judge candidates in an ordinal scale of merit with two
grades, so AV becomes MJ with a language of two grades (called Approval
Judgment in [2]), escapes Arrow’s impossibility theorem, and inherits the other
good properties of MJ (except for the limitations due to too few grades). With
this point of view MJ vs AV turns into an argument over how many grades MJ
should use.
The second intent of the article is to show that two grades are too few (how-
ever AV is viewed). Two obviously permits no nuance in the expression of voters’
opinions, in and of itself this is sufficiently damning. AV’s behavior also shows
that two is too few. It is proven that with MJ the no-show paradox—extremely
unlikely in practice with three or more grades—cannot occur when there are
three grades, so overcomes all the AV-enthusiasts’ criticisms.
1AV thus viewed is “completely indeterminant” in the following sense: by varying voters’
choices of sincere strategies—moving the cut-off line between Approve and Disapprove in their
preference lists—identical individual preferences can produce every possible order-of-finish so
every possible winner. This is true of the election described in section 2.1 [37].
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In general, it is argued, majority judgment is a significantly better replace-
ment for majority rule than approval voting has pretended to be.2
1 Methods
A method of ranking candidates (or more generally competitors) based on
measures as versus comparisons begins by formulating a question appropri-
ate to its use (in elections to political offices, or in competitions among figure
skaters, wines, pianists, or movies) and defining an ordinal scale  of merit or
evaluation—a language of grades Λ—of possible answers. In elections, scales of
five to seven ordinal grades have been used; wines have used 21 numerical grades
(in Australia) or seven ordinal grades for each of 14 attributes (by the U.I.Œ.);
the Chopin International Piano Competition has used 100 at an elimination
stage and 12 for six finalists (for these and other examples see [2].).
Given a language of grades Λ, a method of voting asks voters (or judges of a
jury) to evaluate every candidate (or competitor) by assigning each a grade in
that scale. The input—called the opinion profile3—may be represented as an
m by n matrix γ = (γij), where m is the number of candidates, n the number
of voters, and γij ∈ Λ the grade assigned to candidate i by voter j.
A method of ranking R is a non-symmetric binary relation R on candidates
that associates to each opinion profile a comparison between them, A R B
meaning that the electorate prefers candidate A to candidate B or is indifferent
between them, A ≈R B that it is indifferent between them, and A R B that
A is strictly preferred.
1.1 Majority judgment (MJ)
The motivation for MJ was to find a meaningful method of ranking that induces
judges and voters to express their evaluations fully and honestly—because an
electorate’s or a jury’s collective rank-order of competitors should depend on
true opinions and not on strategically calculated expressions—that avoids the
bugbears of the traditional theory. It has been described and characterized
in several different ways [2, 5, 6]. MJ is based on one single concept that
generalizes the idea of median and is not, as has repeatedly been claimed, the
median together with “an elaborate set of rules for breaking ties. These are
plausible, but there are other tie-breaking rules that would probably work just
as well” [12].
Succinctly put,
2An August 8, 2018 open message to the membership of INFORMS sent by its President,
Nicholas G. Hall, urged all to vote in the election of INFORMS officers. In it he states that
historically only some 20% vote. AV is used although whenever one officer is to be elected
there are but two official candidates. Given the arguments of this article the time has perhaps
come for INFORMS to reconsider the method it uses to elect its officers.
3The preference profile of traditional social choice theory—voters’ rank-orderings of the
candidates—may be deduced from the opinion profile when the scale of grades is sufficiently
rich.
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MJ is majority rule applied to grades,
as the following description shows.
What is the electorate’s majority opinion of one candidate with grades cast
by n voters? Voters must be treated equally so who gave which grade is of no
importance. Define a candidate’s merit profile to be the set of her grades listed
from highest on the left to lowest on the right:
α = (α1, . . . , αn) where αi  αi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
For any k less than a majority, 0 ≤ k < n/2, partition the candidate’s merit
profile into a middlemost block, and left and right blocks of an equal number of
grades:
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
α1  · · ·αk 
n−2k︷ ︸︸ ︷
αk+1  · · ·  αn−k 
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
αn−k+1  · · ·  αn
The right and middlemost blocks show there is a majority of n − k for giving
the candidate at most the grade αk+1, and the left and middlemost blocks that
there is a majority of n − k for giving the candidate at least the grade αn−k:
call this a 100(n − k)/n%-majority for [αk+1, αn−k]. When k = 0 this is the
unanimous decision for evaluating the candidate at best α1 and at worse αn.
The larger k the closer to equal are its two grades αk+1 and αn−k, so the more
precise is the majority evaluation. For n odd taking k = (n − 1)/2 means the
middlemost block is reduced to a single grade called the majority-grade, the
most precise majority evaluation possible.
Consider a real example. The name for a newly formed computer sciences
laboratory (the fusion of two existing groups in the spring of 2015) at the Uni-
versite´ Paris-Diderot (Paris 7) was to be chosen. Ten names were proposed
(here called A through J), 95 persons voted, and they chose a language of five
grades4:
Good, Rather Good, Not Bad Not Good, Rather Bad, Bad.
A’s merit profile was
Rather Not Bad Rather
Good Good Not Good Bad Bad
A 35.79% 24.21% 24.21% 10.53% 5.26%
or equivalently, in order to see the middle (designated by l),
Rather Rather Not Bad Rather
Good Good l Good Not Good Bad Bad
A 35.79% 14.21% l 10.00% 24.21% 10.53% 5.26%
4The actual words were: Bien, Plutoˆt bien, Ni bien ni mal, Plutoˆt mal, Mal.
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50% of the grades are to the left of the middle, 50% are to the right. There
is a 100%-majority for [Good, Bad ]; and a 50+%-majority5 for [Rather Good,
Rather Good ]. For any x, 50 < x% ≤ 100%, there is a x%-majority for at
most one grade and at least another; e.g., there is a 75%-majority for [Good,
Not Bad Not Good ]. When the two grades are equal they are the competitor’s
majority-grade, so A’s majority-grade is Rather Good. Naturally the smallest
x% (> 50%) yields the most precise majority decision: with many voters it is
essentially certain that they are equal, so the majority-grade.
How does a majority of an electorate rank candidates having sets of grades?
Clearly when one candidate’s grades are uniformly better than another’s (s)he
must be ranked above the other.
A candidate A’s merit profile α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) dominates B’s
merit profile β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) (both written from highest to low-
est) when αi  βi for all i and αk  βk for at least one k; equiv-
alently, when A has at least as many of the highest grade as B, at
least as many of the two highest grades,. . . , at least as many of the
k highest grades for all k, and at least one “at least” is “more.”6
Every method of ranking should respect domination on every pair of candidates:
namely, evaluate one above another when the first’s grades dominate the other’s.
When one candidate’s majority-grade is above another’s s(he) must be ranked
above the other. When both have the same majority-grade—e.g., A and B in
the choice of a new name for the laboratory are both rated Rather Good—the
most precise majority or the smallest x for which there are x%-majorities for
both that differ decides.
Rather Rather Not Bad Rather
Good Good l Good Not Good Bad Bad
A 35.79% 14.21% l 10.00% 24.21% 10.53% 5.26%
B 17.89% 32.11% l 01.57% 20.00% 20.00% 8.42%
Table 1. Merit profiles, laboratory names, Universite´ Paris-Diderot,
spring 2015.
Both have x%-majorities for [Rather Good, Rather Good ] for every x, 50 +  ≤
x ≤ 51.57. The smallest x where they differ are the 51.57+%-majorities: for
A it is [Rather Good, Rather Good ] and for B [Rather Good, Not Bad Not
Good ]; A’s is better than B’s so A must be ahead of B in the MJ-ranking.
These 51.57+%-majorities are determined by the smallest of the four among
{14.21%, 10.00%, 32.11%, 1.57%}.
An equivalent description leads to an intuitive rule. Let pA% and qA% be
A’s percentages of grades strictly above and strictly below her majority-grade,
and likewise for B. pA = 50− 14.21 = 35.79%, qA = 50− 40.00 = 10.00%, and
pB = 17.89%, qB = 48.43%. The 51.57+%-majorities are determined by the
5Interpret  as one grade.
6In other contexts domination is called first-order stochastic dominance.
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biggest of these four, and the rule is this: if the biggest is for a higher grade
that candidate leads the other, if it is for a lower grade that candidate lags the
other.
A simple diagram pictures the situation in general.
A’s merit profile: · · · · · ·
︷ ︸︸ ︷
[α¯ · · · l · · ·α] · · · · · ·
== ==
B’s merit profile: · · · · · · [β¯ · · · l · · ·β]︸ ︷︷ ︸ · · · · · ·
Candidate A is ahead of B in the MJ-ranking MJ when: A’s and B’s middle-
most grades (bracketed around the center, l) are all equal except for the left-
and right-most (as indicated by ), α¯ 6= β¯ or/and α 6= β, and either
• [α¯ · · · l · · ·α] dominates [β¯ · · · l · · ·β], or
• [α¯ · · · l · · ·α] is more consensual7 than [β¯ · · · l · · ·β],
meaning β¯  α¯  α  β.
Thus a succinct complete description of how the majority principle ranks is
this:
The MJ-ranking MJ : For each pair of competitors ignore the max-
imum equal number of highest and lowest grades of their merit pro-
files so that when the remaining middlemost grades are compared
domination or consensus decides.
This rule—the logical outcome of applying the majority principle to grades—
is what many seem to have been groping for. For example, the Fe´de´ration
International de Natation (FINA) traditionally used a point-summing method
for diving, with each of five or seven judges assigning a number grade between
0 and 10 in multiples of 12 (the meanings of each carefully defined [18]) to every
dive, the sums of grades determining the rankings. Recently, it changed: when
there are five judges the highest and lowest grades are eliminated, when there are
seven the two highest and two lowest are eliminated, and then the sums of the
remaining grades decide the rankings. Had FINA (or the International Skating
Union, the International Gymnastics Federation, or others) gone a bit further—
eliminating what must be to distinguish a difference and letting domination or
consensus decide rather than sums—they would have used MJ.
It is immediately evident that in practice when there are many voters, (1)
every candidate will have a majority-grade, and (2) in comparing candidates
consensus is almost surely never invoked since that would require ties in the
determination of the maximum number of the rule. Accordingly, assume this is
the case and define candidate A’s majority-gauge (MG) to be (pA%, αA, qA%),
and likewise for any candidate, with αA her majority-grade, pA% the percentage
of her grades strictly above αA, qA% the percentage of her grades strictly below
αA.
7In other contexts domination is called first-order stochastic dominance and consensus is
called second-order stochastic dominance.
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The MG-ranking MG:
A MG B when
 αA  αB or,αA = αB and pA > max{qA, pB , qB} or,
αA = αB and qB > max{pA, qA, pB}.
Consistent with the usual interpretation, “+” may be attached to a
majority-grade αC when pC > qC , and “−” otherwise.
With many voters the MG-ranking is for all practical purposes identical to the
MJ-ranking.
Good Rather Good Not Bad Not Good Rather Bad Bad
A 35.79% 24.21% 24.21% 10.53% 5.26%
B 17.89% 33.68% 20.00% 20.00% 8.42%
C 31.58% 14.74% 24.21% 15.79% 13.68%
D 13.68% 27.37% 17.89% 22.11% 18.95%
E 18.95% 12.63% 20.00% 21.05% 27.37%
F 15.79% 11.58% 20.00% 24.21% 28.42%
G 15.79% 10.53% 16.84% 25.26% 31.58%
H 10.53% 8.42% 8.42% 16.84% 55.79%
I 7.37% 10.53% 9.47% 15.79% 56.84%
J 4.21% 9.47% 9.47% 18.95% 57.89%
Table 2a. Merit profile, names for newly formed computer sciences laboratory,
Universite´ Paris-Diderot.8
The full merit profile of the vote at the Universite´ Paris-Diderot is given in
Table 2a. Of the 45 pair-by-pair comparisons of grades, 40 are dominations, so
all reasonable methods should rank them identically. The MJ-ranking (=the
MG-ranking) is given in Table 2b.
p α q
A 35.79% Rather Good− 40.00%
B 17.89% Rather Good− 48.42%
C 46.32% Not Bad Not Good+ 29.37%
D 41.05% Not Bad Not Good− 41.06%
E 31.58% Not Bad Not Good− 48.42%
F 47.37% Rather Bad+ 28.42%
G 43.16% Rather Bad+ 31.58%
H 44.21% Bad+ –
I 43.16% Bad+ –
J 42.11% Bad+ –
Table 2b. MJ-ranking MJ , names for newly formed computer sciences
laboratory, Universite´ Paris-Diderot (max{p, q} in bold).9
8The order of the names is chosen to coincide with the MJ=MG-ranking for added clarity.
9The name chosen (A) was “Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris Diderot.”
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1.2 Majority rule and the domination paradox
Majority rule (MR)—also called plurality rule and first-past-the-post—is the
most used method of voting: voters tick the name of one candidate at most, the
ranking of the candidates is determined by their numbers of ticks (used, e.g.,
in Great Britain and the USA); if the top-ranked candidate does not obtain an
absolute majority of ticks sometimes (e.g., France) a run-off is held between the
two top finishers (call this MR+).
That MR and MR+ measures the relative support of candidates badly was
recognized long ago by both Condorcet [15] and Borda [9]. Recent elections in
the USA and France prove the point. George W. Bush defeated Albert Gore
in 2000 due to the presence of Ralph Nader’s candidacy: Bush’s margin of 537
votes in Florida gave him the state’s 25 Electoral College votes; had Nader not
been on the ballot most of his voters would have preferred Gore, making him
the victor in Florida and the nation. Jacques Chirac was elected France’s pres-
ident in 2002 because the candidate who would in all likelihood have defeated
him face-to-face, Lionel Jospin, was eliminated in a first-round of 16 candi-
dates, resulting in a second-round that pitted Chirac against a candidate that
almost any candidate would have defeated, Jean-Marie Le Pen: the presence of
candidates with absolutely no hope of being elected eliminated Jospin. Nico-
las Sarkozy won France’s 2007 presidential election for much the same reason:
Franc¸ois Bayrou would have defeated any candidate face-to-face—he was the
Condorcet-winner—but was eliminated in the first-round. A recent study of
the 2017 French legislative elections [32] shows that in 19.2% of the 577 elec-
tions the presence of three candidates (in run-offs) denied the election of the
Condorcet-winner.
What has not heretofore been appreciated is that MR may go badly wrong
in face-to-face encounters, i.e., when there are but two candidates.
A method is subject to the domination paradox if a candidate A’s
grades dominate B’s but the method ranks B above A.
MR is subject to the domination paradox. A national French presidential poll
of 2012 (described more fully below) proves the point. The leading pretenders
Outst- Excel- Very Good Fair Poor To
anding lent Good Reject
Hollande 12.48% 16.15% 16.42% 11.67% 14.79% 14.25% 14.24%
Sarkozy 9.63% 12.35% 16.28% 10.99% 11.13% 7.87% 31.75%
Table 3a. Merit profile, Hollande-Sarkozy, 2012 French presidential poll.
were F. Hollande and N. Sarkozy. Hollande’s grades dominate Sarkozy’s (Table
3a) yet their merit profile could have come from the opinion profile of Table 3b.
9.63% 12.35% 11.67% 4.61% 10.18% 11.13% 14.24%
Hollande: Exc. V.Good Good Fair Fair Poor Rej.
Sarkozy: Outs. Exc. V.Good V.Good Good Fair Rej.
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0.81% 7.87% 3.80% 6.52% 4.07% 3.12%
Hollande: Outs. Outs. Outs. Exc. V.Good Poor
Sarkozy: Good Poor Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej.
Table 3b. Possible opinion profile, Hollande-Sarkozy (giving the merit profile
of table 3a), national poll, 2012 French presidential election.
Using MR a voter would tick the candidate (s)he evaluates higher and ab-
stain or vote blank when both candidates are evaluated To Reject. This makes
Sarkozy the overwhelming MR-winner with 59.57% of the votes to Hollande’s
26.19%, 14.24% rejecting both.
In fact Hollande defeated Sarkozy in the run-off obtaining 51.6% of the votes,
whereas the opinion profile of the national poll showed Hollande winning with
53.9% of the votes. These relatively narrow victories when Hollande’s grades
completely dominated those of Sarkozy—and Hollande’s majority-grade was
Good, Sarkozy’s Fair—show that MR can easily go wrong in practice. This is
not an isolated event.
Another example is the US presidential election of 2016. The Pew Research
Center conducted four in-depth national polls during the course of the election.
Among the many questions posed to the participants was the following: “What
kind of president do you think each of the following would be—a great, good,
average, poor, or terrible president?” Pew Research did not realize that this
provides the inputs to a method of election; however, the fact that they used it is
testimony to their belief that the question is natural and the answers revelatory
of the electorate’s opinion. The last of the four polls was conducted shortly
before the election in the period October 20-25 with the result given in Table
4a (except for a 1% change to make a point).
Great Good Average Poor Terrible
Hillary Clinton 9% 26% 20% 11% 34%
Donald Trump 9% 18% 16% 11% 46%
Table 4a. Merit profiles, 2016 US presidential poll, Pew Research, October
20-25 [31]. (Clinton’s 9% Great was in fact 8% and her 26% Good was 27%.)
Clinton’s grades very comfortably dominate Trump’s so MJ (together with
any reasonable method) makes Clinton the winner. Moreover, Clinton’s majority-
grade is Average and Trump’s merely Poor (with or without the 1% change).
Yet their merit profiles could well have come from the opinion profile of Table
4b. With it MR elects Trump with 49% of the votes to Clinton’s 28%, the
remaining 23% of the voters judging both to be Terrible.
9% 18% 11% 11%
Clinton Good Average Poor Terrible
Trump Great Good Average Poor
5% 4% 17% 2% 23%
Clinton Great Great Good Average Terrible
Trump Average Terrible Terrible Terrible Terrible
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Table 4b. Possible opinion profile, Clinton-Trump (giving merit profile of table
4a), Pew Research poll, 2016 U.S. presidential election.
The lesson is clear: MR can easily go wrong even in an election with two can-
didates. This has far reaching consequences because AV (as practiced), Borda’s,
Condorcet’s, and all methods based on voters’ preferences as versus evaluations
become MR when only two candidates compete.
A case in point may well be the 2016 U.S. election. Clinton’s and Trump’s
merit profiles were remarkably similar throughout the year—in January, March,
August and October—despite the many dramatic ups and downs of the cam-
paign as may be seen in Table 4c.
Clinton: Great Good Average Poor Terrible
January 11% 24% 18% 16% 31%
March 11% 22% 20% 16% 31%
August 11% 20% 22% 12% 35%
October 8% 27% 20% 11% 34%
Trump:
January 11% 20% 12% 14% 43%
March 10% 16% 12% 15% 47%
August 9% 18% 15% 12% 46%
October 9% 17% 16% 11% 47%
Table 4c. Merit profiles, 2016 U.S. presidential polls, Pew Research [31].
Clinton’s grades dominated Trump’s in January, March and August, and
nearly did in October; her majority-grade was Average and his Poor all four
times. So why did Clinton lose? U.S. voters were in open revolt, determined to
show their exasperation with politicians. But how, with MR, could they express
this disgust other than by voting for Trump? Had they been able to express
their opinions more fully—rating Clinton Poor or Terrible but Trump as Poor
or Terrible as well—Trump’s very narrow MR victories in Florida, Michigan,
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania might well have become Clinton’s giving her 307
Electoral College votes to Trump’s 231.
1.3 Approval voting (AV)
AV is a very slight improvement over MR (when there are more than two candi-
dates): voters tick the name of any number of candidates they wish, the ranking
of the candidates is determined by their numbers of ticks. That is its traditional
point-summing explanation when used.
If, however, AV voters are specifically asked to evaluate candidates in a
scale of merit that contains Approve and Disapprove—contrary to when it is
used with voters asked to tick candidates—AV is MJ with a language of two
grades. It has a simple description (already evident from the SCW Society’s
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instructions): taking
λIj =
{
1 when voter j assigns Approve to candidate I and
0 when voter j assigns Disapprove to candidate I,
AV ranks candidate A above candidate B when:
A AV B when
∑
j
λAj >
∑
j
λBj .
If Approve meant Good or better to the Universite´ Paris-Diderot voters the
AV-ranking would have been
A AV C AV E AV B AV F ≈AV G AV D AV H AV I AV J.
That is very different from the MJ-ranking. In this case AV and MJ give
the identical winner (A’s grades largely dominate any other name’s grades).
However, AV does not respect domination because F and G are tied and yet F ’s
grades dominate G’s (this happens because two grades are too few). However,
AV respects weak domination: if one candidate’s grades dominate another’s the
first either leads the second or they are tied.
2 MJ vs. AV: practice
How and why AV fails in practice—in particular, fails in comparison with MJ—
is shown via several different uses and experiments.
The inputs to voting are ballots filled out by electors. In a majority vote a
ballot poses no question. The voter knows at most one candidate may be given a
tick, and the candidates’ total ticks decide. Similarly, a typical AV-ballot poses
no question but specifies that the voter may give as many ticks as he wishes
and the total ticks decide (see Table 5a).
Vote for one or more candidates by ticking in the appropriate circles.
The candidate with the most votes wins.
© Candidate 1
© · · ·
© Candidate m
Table 5a. Typical AV-ballot.
Accordingly, ticks are given for completely different evaluations of the can-
didates and there is no sense that giving no tick to a candidate means he is
Disapproved. Moreover, instead of eliciting an evaluation of the candidates the
instructions suggest comparing them.
Having considered all relevant information, I believe in conscience,
that as President of the United States of America
each of the following candidates would be:
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Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor Terrible
Candidate 1
· · ·
Candidate m
You must check one single grade for each candidate; no check is taken to mean Terrible.
Table 5b. Typical MJ-ballot.
The ballot of Table 5b implicitly forces every voter to evaluate every candi-
date. There are alternatives to handling “missing grades” (see section 13.4 [2]).
Among them one “ compensates fairly”: calculate the majority-grade αC of
each candidate C with the grades that are given; then adjoin αC to C’s grades
as many times as necessary to obtain the full complement of grades.
A typical MJ-ballot poses a question and elicits an answer in a scale of grades
easily understood by voters or judges (see Table 5b).10 The question emphasizes
the distinct meanings of the answers that are to be given by the voters and that
are by and large shared among them. In contrast, the meanings of the ticks or
the Approves given by a voter in AV-voting vary widely.
2.1 1999 SCW Society 1999
AV was used in the 1999 election of the Social Choice and Welfare Society’s
president [13, 35]. Members were also asked to indicate their preferences among
the three candidates (called A, B, and C). Seventy-one members voted, giving
the outcome (where numbers attached to candidates indicate their AV-scores)
A(32) AV C(30) AVAV B(14).
Two voters ticked three candidates; three ticked two; 64 ticked one; two none.
Fifty-two members gave their preferences
13 : A  B  C 11 : A  C  B 9 : B  C  A
11 : C  A  B 8 : C  B  A
Their AV-scores were
A(22) AV C(20) AV B(14),
giving the same result; here one voter ticked two candidates, 49 ticked one
candidate, and 2 ticked none. In this case the face-to-face majority rule votes
yield a transitive order (called the Condorcet-ranking)
C MR A MR B,
since (where numbers attached to candidates give their votes)
C(28) MR A(24) C(30) MR B(22) A(35) MR B(17);
10
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whereas Borda’s method11 gives the outcome (where the numbers attached to
candidates indicate their Borda-scores)
A(59/52) B C(58/52) B B(39/52).
AV elects the Borda-winner not the Condorcet-winner.
• It is claimed that “[t]he AV and [Borda] winners generally coincide with the
Condorcet winner”12 and that AV has “a strong propensity to elect Condorcet
candidates” [13]. AV cannot guarantee the election of a Condorcet-winner, as
this example shows. These claims are often violated when the result between a
pair of candidates is “close” (not surprisingly most methods agree when there
are strong winners). Experimental evidence shows that AV-winners are often
not Condorcet-winners and often not Borda-winners (see [2], Table 19.1, p. 343).
2.2 French presidential election 2002
In the belief that AV was a reasonable method an experiment was conducted
on April 21, 2002, in parallel with the official vote (for more details see [2] pp.
329-333). It was realized in five of Orsay’s twelve voting precincts and the one
voting precinct of Gy-les-Nonais (Loiret), where 3,346 voters cast official votes
(at most one vote for one candidate) and were then asked to participate in the
experiment by casting AV-votes. As in subsequent experiments carried out in
France permission was obtained to place separate voting booths and urns on
the paths of voters who had already cast their official votes: 2,597 voters (78%)
participated.
The AV-ballot stated: “The elector votes by placing crosses [in boxes cor-
responding to candidates]. He may place crosses for as many candidates as he
wishes, but not more than one per candidate. The winner is the candidate with
the most crosses.”
11The Borda-ranking is determined by a candidate’s Borda-score, the average of her votes
against every opponent.
12For a precise mathematical analysis of the relation between Borda and Condorcet out-
comes see [36].
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Official vote AV-score % of all crosses
Lionel Jospin 19.5% (1st) 40.5% (1st) 12.9%
Jacques Chirac 18.9% (2nd) 36.5% (2nd) 11.6%
Jean-Marie Le Pen 10.0% (3rd) 14.6% (11th) 04.6%
Franc¸ois Bayrou 09.9% (4th) 33.5% (3rd) 10.7%
Jean-Pierre Cheve`nement 08.1% (5th) 30.3% (4th) 08.1%
Noe¨l Mame`re 07.9% (6th) 28.9% (5th) 09.2%
Alain Madelin 05.0% (7th) 21.3% (6th) 06.8%
Arlette Laguiller 03.7% (8th) 15.4% (10th) 04.9%
Christiane Taubira 03.2% (9th) 18.9% (7th) 06.0%
Olivier Besancenot 03.1% (10th) 17.6% (9th) 05.6%
Corinne Lepage 02.8% (11th) 17.9% (8th) 05.7%
Robert Hue 02.7% (12th) 11.5% (12th) 03.6%
Jean Saint-Josse 01.7% (13th) 07.8% (13th) 02.5%
Christine Boutin 01.3% (14th) 07.8% (14th) 02.5%
Bruno Me´gret 01.3% (15th) 07.7% (15th) 02.4%
Daniel Gluckstein 00.8% (16th) 04.3% (16th) 01.4%
Table 6. Votes and ranks, official and AV, Orsay/Gy-les-Nonais, 1st round
French presidential election, April 21, 2002 [2].
The results are given in Table 6. The three major candidates according
to popular opinion and the majority vote all lost relative support, the top-
ranked candidate Jospin dropping to 12.9%; whereas all the others (except
Cheve`nement) gained, making the final ranking less rather than more defini-
tive. Jospin’s 40.5% to Chirac’s 36.5% does not give him added legitimacy.
The results do not accurately measure the relative standings of Chirac and Le
Pen, the run-off candidates. In these six voting precincts Chirac defeated Le Pen
with 89.3% of the votes. There are three possible ways to estimate that outcome
using the information revealed by AV. The difficulty is how to “count” a ballot
that either gives a cross to both candidates or gives no cross to both. Three
estimates were made, in all a cross for one candidate and none for the other gave
a 1 to the first. Otherwise, (1) crosses to both and crosses to neither gave both
1/2 (expressing indifference); (2) crosses to both gave both 1/2 (indifference),
crosses to neither gave both 0 (says nothing); and (3) crosses to both and crosses
to neither gave both 0 (saying nothing). These three interpretations gave the
following results, all far from the actual result: (1) Chirac 61%, Le Pen 39%,
(2) Chirac 79%, Le Pen 21%, (3) Chirac 80%, Le Pen 20%. This suggests that
AV measures badly.
This experiment shows how far an electorate can be from having single-
peaked preferences.13 If the preferences were single-peaked then the crosses on
each ballot would have to be in consecutive boxes (relative to the fixed left-right
order). With 16 candidates there are 137 such ballots (16 with 1 cross, 15 with 2
13An electorate’s preferences are single-peaked if the candidates can be listed in a fixed
order from left to right so that every voter prefers some one candidate C and the more distant
a candidate D is from C to the left or to the right the lower D is in the voter’s preferences.
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crosses, 14 with 3 crosses, . . . , 1 with 16 crosses), so among the 2,597 ballots at
most 137 could be different. In fact, there were many more: 813. However, these
AV-ballots were used to deduced how the candidates line-up along a left-right
spectrum.14 This is merely statistical, single-peakedness does not hold, so the
existence of a Condorcet-winner is not guaranteed. Nonetheless, Condorcet-
cycles may be avoided when sufficiently many voters’ preferences are single-
peaked with respect to a fixed order of the candidates (see, e.g., [28, 19, 22]).
• After citing an example where with plurality voting a winning candidate
received less than a third of the votes but would have had 54% with AV, it is
claimed that it “often will . . . confer legitimacy on their victories to the extent
that it shows their support to be widespread” ([14], p. 8). On the contrary,
with many candidates spanning a wide and polarized political spectrum AV will
often fail to clearly distinguish a winner; moreover, the winner will often fail to
be conferred the supposed “legitimacy” of an AV-score close to or above 50%.
• AV measures badly because of its two grades or its limitation to ticks.
This experiment convinced us that AV is a flawed method—completely
changing our earlier view—and spurred the search for another method.
2.3 2009 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity
in Journalism
As Louis Lyons Award designate, having taken into account
all relevant considerations, I believe in conscience that this nominee is:
Absolutely Outs- Excel- Very Strong Commen- Neut-
Outstanding tanding lent Strong dable ral
Nominee
Check one grade in the line of each nominee. No check is interpreted to mean Neutral .
Table 7a. Ballot for the Louis Lyons Award, 2009 (one line for each nominee).
The Nieman Fellows at Harvard University traditionally decide to whom this
award is given. Five highly regarded nominees emerged from a set of many. The
Fellows decided to use MJ and the scale of seven grades given in the ballot of
Table 7a. The behavior of the judges in this real use of MJ is very similar to
that of voters in electoral experiments (see Table 7b): only one judge J6 gave
different grades to all nominees; three judges did not use the highest grade; five
gave their highest grade to at least two nominees; and contrary to the predictions
of many, judges are far from limiting themselves to the highest or lowest grades.
14See [2], section 6.2, “Statistical left-right spectra.”
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Judge C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 Judge C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
J1 4 5 5 3 3 J2 5 5 6 3 4
J3 6 5 5 5 5 J4 6 6 6 6 5
J5 6 5 4 4 5 J6 2 5 6 1 3
J7 6 5 6 5 2 J8 6 5 5 6 5
J9 5 0 0 0 0 J10 5 1 5 6 1
J11 5 3 4 3 6 J12 6 6 6 5 5
J13 3 0 0 4 0 J14 6 4 3 0 0
J15 6 5 0 0 0 J16 3 5 6 2 2
J17 6 2 2 2 2 J18 6 5 5 5 5
J19 6 5 4 4 2
Table 7b. Opinion profile, Louis Lyons Award, 2009.
(6=Absolutely Outstanding, 5=Outstanding, . . . , 0=Neutral)
The merit profile is given in Table 7c, and the MJ- and several AV-rankings
in Table 7d. Five nominees implies ten comparisons: eight of them are domi-
nations. The two presumably reasonable interpretations for Approve—at least
Excellent or at least Very Strong—result in a tie between C2 and C3. The in-
terpretation at least Outstanding results in a tie between C4 and C5—whereas
C4’s grades dominate C5’s—showing that AV does not respect domination.
Absolutely Outs- Excel- Very Strong Commen- Neut-
Outstanding tanding lent Strong dable ral
C1 11 4 1 2 1 – –
C2 2 11 1 1 1 1 2
C3 6 5 3 1 1 – 3
C4 3 4 3 3 2 1 3
C5 1 6 1 2 4 1 4
Table 7c. Merit profile, Louis Lyons Award, 2009.
MJ-ranking AV
p α q Outstanding Excellent Very Strong
C1 – Absolutely Outstanding 8 15 16 18
C2 2 Outstanding 6 13 14 15
C3 6 Outstanding 8 11 14 15
C4 7 Excellent 9 7 10 13
C5 8 Very Strong 9 7 8 10
Table 7d. Rankings15, Louis Lyons Award, 2009 (max{p, q} in bold)
•With few voters AV often ends in ties although the grades of one competitor
dominate another’s. Once again, two grades are simply insufficient.
2.4 Socialist presidential primary, Alfortville 2011.
For the first time ever the French Socialist Party held an open public primary
to name their candidate for 2012. It used MR+. E´cole Polytechnique students
[21] carried out experiments designed to compare MJ and AV in voting bureaus
15Borda and MJ yield the same rankings; the Condorcet-ranking exchanges the places of
C2 and C3.
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of Alfortville, a town next to Paris. Participants were asked to vote via MJ-
and AV-ballots and to answer several questions.
The MJ-ballot charged the voter, “As the Socialist Party’s nominee in the
2012 presidential election, after having taken into account all considerations,
I judge in conscience that this candidate would be:” and offered six possible
responses, either Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or To Reject.
The AV-ballot stated “For each of the following candidates to be the Socialist
Party’s nominee in the presidential election of 2012, I declare:” and offered
two possible responses, either Approve his/her candidacy or Disapprove his/her
candidacy. A specific question was asked—not the usual practice—and it made
clear that the alternative to Approve is Disapprove.
Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor to Reject
Hollande 40.1% 34.5% 12.3% 7.0% 2.5% 3.5%
Aubry 33.1% 36.3% 12.7% 7.4% 3.5% 7.0%
Montebourg 12.0% 27.8% 23.9% 13.7% 11.6% 10.9%
Valls 10.9% 17.6% 26.8% 16.2% 12.0% 16.5%
Royal 12.3% 14.8% 25.7% 18.0% 12.0% 17.3%
Baylet 1.4% 4.6% 14.4% 21.1% 29.6% 28.9%
Table 8a. Merit profile, Alfortville, 2011 [21].
The merit profile is given in Table 8a. 468 persons voted officially, of them
292 (62%) participated in the experiment and 284 votes were valid. The winner
is immediately clear because Hollande’s grades dominate all the other candi-
dates’ grades; indeed, each candidate’s grades dominate the next candidate’s
from top to bottom except for Royal. The results are given in Table 8b, where
“AV-score” are the participants’ AV-votes, “Reported votes” are those they de-
clared having been their official FPP votes (284 voters); “Official FPP” are the
actual first-round results (468 voters); and “AV Good” are the AV results if
Approve means Good or better. The MJ- and AV-rankings are the same except
that AV puts Royal in 4th place and Valls in 5th.
MJ- AV- AV Reported Official
ranking p α q score Good votes FPP
(1) Hollande 40.1% Very Good+ 25.3% 87.3% 87.0% 37.7% 39.7%
(2) Aubry 33.1% Very Good+ 30.6% 85.2% 82.0% 29.2% 28.9%
(3) Montebourg 39.8% Good+ 36.2% 64.1% 63.7% 12.5% 12.3%
(4) Valls 28.5% Good− 44.7% 53.2% 55.3% 10.0% 08.6%
(5) Royal 27.1% Good− 47.2% 53.5% 52.8% 10.3% 09.7%
(6) Baylet 41.5% Poor+ 28.9% 25.7% 20.4% 00.4% 00.7%
Table 8b. Results, Alfortville, 2011 [21] (max{p, q} in bold).
The top two AV-scores are both overwhelming, depriving the winner of undis-
puted legitimacy. Majorities Approve all candidates (except Baylet, member of
another party) as versus more conflictual elections where no candidate is Ap-
proved by a majority (e.g., the presidential election of 2002, see above).
Statistically the voters behaved as if Approve meant Good or better, as may
be seen by comparing the AV-score with AVGood (Table 8b). However, the
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ballots reveal that voters’ thresholds at which they begin to Approve varied very
widely (see Table 8c), only a third of them interpreting Approve to mean Good
or better.
Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor to Reject
24 72 94 54 28 12
8.5% 25.4% 33.1% 19.0% 9.9% 4.2%
Table 8c. Thresholds for Approve, Alfortville, 2011 [21].
• Voters attribute very different meanings to Approve even when it is clear
that its opposite is Disapprove, so two grades are too few, putting into question
the meaningfulness of an AV-score. There is a striking disparity between con-
flictual or polarized elections and more consensual ones such as primaries: often
in the former no candidate passes the threshold of an AV-score above 50%, in
the latter many do. Among the 268 who answered which of MJ and AV per-
mitted them to better express their opinions, not surprisingly MJ was cited by
66.8% to AV’s 33.2%.
2.5 French presidential poll 2012.
Terra Nova, a French think-tank, sponsored a national presidential poll carried
out by OpinionWay April 12-16, 2012 (before the first-round of the election held
on April 22) to compare MJ with other methods. 993 participants voted with
MJ and also according to usual practice—first-past-the-post (FPP) followed by
a MR run-off between every pair of the five most likely leaders of the first round.
Since the results of FPP varied slightly from the actual national percentages on
election day (up to 5%) a set of 737 ballots was found for which those tallies
are closely matched, whose merit profile is in Table 9a.
Outst- Excel- Very Good Fair Poor To
anding lent Good Reject
F. Hollande 12.48% 16.15% 16.42% 11.67% 14.79% 14.25% 14.24%
F. Bayrou 2.58% 9.77% 21.71% 25.24% 20.08% 11.94% 08.69%
N. Sarkozy 9.63% 12.35% 16.28% 10.99% 11.13% 7.87% 31.75%
J.-L. Me´lenchon 5.43% 9.50% 12.89% 14.65% 17.10% 15.06% 25.37%
N. Dupont-Aignan 0.54% 2.58% 5.97% 11.26% 20.22% 25.51% 33.92%
E. Joly 0.81% 2.99% 6.51% 11.80% 14.65% 24.69% 38.53%
P. Poutou 0.14% 1.36% 4.48% 7.73% 12.48% 28.09% 45.73%
M. Le Pen 5.97% 7.33% 9.50% 9.36% 13.98% 6.24% 47.63%
N. Arthaud 0.00% 1.36% 3.80% 6.51% 13.16% 25.24% 49.93%
J. Cheminade 0.41% 0.81% 2.44% 5.83% 11.67% 26.87% 51.97%
Table 9a. Merit profile,16 2012 French presidential poll (737 ballots) [4].
16The row sums may differ from 100% due to round-off errors.
18
MJ- AV-score Official
ranking p α q  Exc. V.Good Good FPP
Hollande 45.05% Good+ 43..28% (1) 28.63 (1) 45.05 (2) 56.72 (1) 28.6%
Bayrou 34.06% Good− 40.71% (5) 12.35 (3) 34.06 (1) 59.30 (5) 09.1%
Sarkozy 49.25% Fair+ 39.62% (2) 21.98 (2) 38.26 (3) 49.25 (2) 27.3%
Me´lenchon 42.47% Fair+ 40.43% (3) 14.93 (4) 27.82 (4) 42.47 (4) 11.0%
Dupont-A. 40.57% Poor+ 33.92% (7) 03.12 (7) 09.09 (7) 20.35 (7) 01.5%
Joly 36.77% Poor− 38.53% (6) 03.80 (6) 10.31 (6) 22.11 (6) 02.3%
Poutou 26.19% Poor− 45.73% (8) 01.50 (8) 05.98 (8) 13.71 (8) 01.2%
Le Pen 46.13% Poor− 47.63% (4) 13.30 (5) 22.80 (5) 32.16 (3) 17.9%
Arthaud 24.83% Poor− 49.93% (9) 01.36 (9) 05.16 (9) 11.67 (9) 00.7%
Cheminade 48.03% Reject+ – (10 01.22 (10) 03.66 (10) 09.49 (10) 00.4%
Table 9b. MJ-ranking, AV-scores when Approve means at least Good, at least
Very Good, and at least Excellent, FPP-scores, 2012 French presidential poll
(737 ballots) [4].
Table 9b gives the majority-gauges of the candidates, three AV-scores—when
Approve means at least Good, at least Very Good, and at least Excellent—and
the FPP ranking to show the marked differences among them. Table 9c gives
the ten MR face-to-face results between the five principal candidates and the
deduced Condorcet- and Borda- rankings.
Me´l- Condor- Borda
Hollande Bayrou Sarkozy enchon Le Pen cet rank score
Hollande – 51.6% 53.9% 68.5% 64.1% (1) 59.5%
Bayrou 48.4% – 56.5% 59.4% 70.5% (2) 58.7%
Sarkozy 46.1% 43.5% – 50.5% 65.7% (3) 51.4%
Me´lenchon 31.5% 40.6% 49.5% – 59.7% (4) 45.3%
Le Pen 35.9% 29.5% 34.3% 40.3% – (5) 35.0%
Table 9c. MR results among five candidates, Condorcet- and Borda-rankings, French
presidential poll 2012 [4].
The FPP ranking is different from all others, showing how the lack of in-
formation concerning the electorate’s evaluations can lead to an outcome that
departs widely from the collective consensus. The extreme rightist Marine Le
Pen is 3rd though she is Rejected by 47.63% of the electorate and rated Poor
or worse by 53.87%, and Franc¸ois Bayrou places 5th although he is much more
consensual than either Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Pen or Jean-Luc Me´lenchon.
The MJ-, Borda- and Condorcet-rankings are identical among the five major
candidates; the three AV-rankings differ. When Approve means Good or better,
Hollande places 2nd (contrary to the usual claim since he is the Condorcet-
winner). When Approve means Very Good or better the winner (Hollande)
receives less than a majority of the votes, curtailing his legitimacy. Two mean-
ings of Approve place Le Pen in 5th place, one places her 4th, whereas MJ
places her 8th: thus AV does better than FPP but does not sufficiently take
into account the weight of Le Pen’s negative evaluations. The three meanings
of Approve place Bayrou 1st, 3rd, and 5th.
• Here three very different methods that use more information than AV
agree, whereas AV differs. Two grades are simply not enough.
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2.6 French presidential election experiment 2012, Fresne.
AV asks voters to tick those candidates they Approve; presumably they Dis-
approve of the others. In the experiment the E´cole Polytechnique students
conducted in the context of the Socialist Party’s primary this had been made
explicit (see above). If the two grades Approve and Disapprove constituted a
sufficiently rich scale then a voter who does not give a tick to a candidate—who
does not Approve of the candidate—Disapproves of the candidate. Therefore, if
instead of asking voters to tick candidates whom they Approve they are asked
to tick voters whom they Disapprove the result should be the same, though here
more ticks means lower in the ranking. This proposition was tested.
The experiment was conducted in Fresnes, another town close to Paris, in
parallel with the first-round of the French presidential election on April 22, 2012
[21].
In Fresnes’s 12th voting bureau the AV-ballot instructed “Tick the box of
each candidate of whom you would APPROVE as President of France,” 771
voted officially, 421 valid MJ- and AV- votes were cast.
Official FPP Official FPP AV DV
each bureau Bur. 12 Bur. 14 Bur. #12 Bur. #14
(1) F. Hollande 39.78% 37.94% (1) 58.31% (1) 24.34%
(2) N. Sarkozy 21.35% 19.03% (4) 25.94% (4) 50.36%
(3) J-L. Me´lenchon 13.67% 15.62% (2) 42.57% (3) 36.52%
(4) M. Le Pen 10.60% 12.20% (6) 12.86% (10) 75.89%
(5) F. Bayrou 7.83% 9.97% (3) 33.70% (2) 28.64%
(6) E. Joly 2.10% 2.61% (5) 13.53% (5) 53.94%
(7) N. Dupont-Aignan 1.71% 2.61% (7) 9.53% (6) 61.58%
(8) P. Poutou 0.79% 0.77% (8) 9.09% (7) 63.72%
(9)N. Arthaud 0.52% 0.46% (9) 3.99% (8) 67.54%
(10) J. Cheminade 0.13% 0.31% (10) 3.77% (9) 69.69%
Table 10a. Results, official FPP, AV and DisAV (ranks in parentheses), French
2012 presidential election experiment, Fresnes, Bureaus 12 and 14 [21].
In Fresnes’s 14th bureau the DV-ballot instructed “Tick the box of each
candidate of whom you would DISAPPROVE as President of France,” 658 voted
officially, 408 valid MJ- and DV-votes were cast.
The official FPP together with the AV and DV results of both bureaus are
given in Table 10a. The order-of-finish according to FPP is identical in both
bureaus (except for a tie between two candidates in Bureau 14); moreover, the
actual vote percentages of the candidates in the two bureaus are very similar.
By this measure the voting behavior in both bureaus is about the same.
However, the AV and DV results in the two bureaus are different: Le Pen
is 6th in one, 10th in the other; Bayrou and Me´lenchon swap their 2nd and
3rd places. More to the point, Approve and Disapprove are not opposites: the
candidates’ sums of Approves and Disapproves are well below 100%, ranging
from a low of 62% to a high of 88%, their average under 75%. There are not
sufficiently many grades.
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Bureau 12 Bureau 14
AV AVGood DV DVPoor
Hollande 58.31% 55.38% Hollande 24.34% 19.17%
Me´lenchon 42.57% 40.19% Bayrou 28.64% 24.72%
Bayrou 33.70% 34.40% Me´lenchon 36.52% 30.59%
Sarkozy 25.94% 21.03% Sarkozy 50.36% 51.22%
Joly 13.53% 14.02% Joly 53.94% 53.89%
Le Pen 12.86% 10.28% Dupont-Aignan 61.58% 62.62%
Dupont-Aignan 9.53% 8.18% Poutou 63.72% 65.05%
Poutou 9.09% 13.55% Arnaud 67.54% 71.12%
Arnaud 3.99% 2.11% Cheminade 69.69% 78.64%
Cheminade 3.77% 2.11% Le Pen 75.89% 71.60%
Table 10b. Actual AV and DV votes compared with AVGood and DVPoor,
French 2012 presidential election experiment, Fresnes [21].
Statistically the AV results of Bureau 12 are close to interpreting Approve to
mean Good or better and the DV results of Bureau 14 are close to Disapprove
meaning Poor or worse (see Table 10b): Fair plays no role whatsoever, again
suggesting that two grades do not suffice.
Out- Excel- Very To
standing lent Good Good Fair Poor Reject
Lowest grades of Approved candidates (Bureau 12):
19.24% 15.91% 30.64% 16.39% 9.26% 2.14% 6.41%
Highest grades of Disapproved candidates (Bureau 14:)
5.45% 5.21% 8.77% 16.11% 22.27% 20.38% 21.80%
Table 10c. Distributions, lowest and highest grades Approved and Disapproved
candidates, French 2012 presidential election experiment, Fresnes [21].
The distributions of the lowest grades given candidates who were Approved and
the highest grades given candidates who were Disapproved are given in Table
10c. As usual voters attribute very different meanings to both Approve and
Disapprove.
The disagreement between AV and DV is easily explained. When a voter is
asked to assign Approve he assigns them only to those he is “sure” to approve
and he evaluates those candidates to whom he gives no ticks at many different
levels, a range of opinions that may vary from (say) Good down to To Reject.
Symmetrically, when a voter is asked to assign Disapproves he assigns them only
to those he is “sure” to disapprove and evaluates candidates to whom he gives
no ticks at many different levels, a range of opinions that may vary from (say)
Outstanding down to Good. In either case voters are not able to adequately
express their opinions.
The Pew Research Center’s in-depth national polls repeatedly pose the same
questions concerning sitting presidents: “Do you approve or disapprove of the
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way Barrack Obama is handling his job as President?” Over Obama’s eight
years in office 79 answers are given ([31] p. 78, references are given there to the
answers concerning George W. Bush and Bill Clinton). The sums of Approves
and Disapproves are always less than 100%, ranging from a high of 95% to a
low of 81% (and similarly for Bush and Clinton).
• Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove. Two grades are simply too few
to adequately express voters’ opinions. At least three grades are necessary.
2.7 Pew Research Center political survey March 2016.
The results of the Pew Research Center’s poll of 1,787 registered voters con-
ducted March 17-27 [30] are given in Table 11a.
Never
Great Good Average Poor Terrible heard of
John Kasich 5% 28% 39% 13% 7% 9%
Bernie Sanders 10% 26% 26% 15% 21% 3%
Ted Cruz 7% 22% 31% 17% 19% 4%
Hillary Clinton 11% 22% 20% 16% 30% 1%
Donald Trump 10% 16% 12% 15% 44% 3%
Table 11a. Pew Research Center poll results, March 17-27, 2016 [30].
p α q AVGood
(1) John Kasich 33% Average+ 29% (2) 33
(2) Bernie Sanders 36% Average− 39% (1) 36
(3) Ted Cruz 29% Average− 40% (4) 29
(4) Hillary Clinton 33% Average− 47% (2) 33
(5) Donald Trump 38% Poor− 47% (5) 26
Table 11b. MJ- and AV-rankings (Never heard of merged with Terrible), Pew
Research Center poll, March 17-27, 2016 [30].
The MJ- and AV-rankings with Approve meaning at least Good are given
in Table 11b. Sander’s grades very nearly dominate Clinton’s yet AV declares
them tied. (When Approve means at least Average the two rankings are the
same.)
• The MJ- and AV-rankings are very different: AV does not sufficiently take
into account the fact that 47% of the participants evaluated Clinton as Poor or
worse (a majority of 62% evaluated Trump as Poor or worse). Once again, two
grades are too few.
3 MJ vs. AV: theory
What does theory say about the AV-supporters’ criticisms of MJ?
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3.1 A winner preferred by only one voter
Brams [12] gives an opinion profile of a jury of five on two candidates to show
MJ may elect a candidate preferred by only one voter essentially the same as:
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5
A: Very Good Very Good Very Good Fair Fair
B: Excellent Excellent Good Good Good
MJ places A above B because A’s majority-grade is Very Good whereas B’s is
Good ; however, only J3 prefers A to B. On the other hand, it is undeniable that
a majority believes A is Very Good and a majority believes B is Good which
happens to be in opposition to the traditional interpretation of majority.
Yet AV can also elect a candidate preferred by only one voter as may be
seen with this very same example. AV with Approve meaning Good or better
places A over B with three ticks to B’s two ticks.
3.2 Condorcet-consistency and manipulation
A method that is Condorcet-consistent is necessarily subject to the domination
paradox. Moreover, many advocated methods are not Condorcet-consistent
when voters express themselves honestly including MJ, AV, the alternative
vote, point-scoring methods, and Borda’s method. So why should Condorcet-
consistency be considered desirable?
One explanation may be Thomas Paine’s: “[A] long habit of not thinking a
thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first
a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time
makes more converts than reason.” [29].
A more serious explanation is the good property that MR with two candi-
dates enjoys. It is strategy-proof or incentive compatible: the best strategy of ev-
ery voter is to vote honestly. Of course this is a good property of a method only
when its results are good with honest behavior (e.g., dictatorship’s strategy-
proofness is not an argument in its favor). Honest grades are of very great
importance: it is the true evaluations of the merits of candidates that should
be amalgamated, not some exaggerated set of grades whose determination relies
on expectations (that in addition, may be erroneous).
So when is MR on two candidates sure to avoid the domination paradox?
Roughly said, when the higher a voter evaluates one candidate the lower (s)he
evaluates the other. Specifically, a pair of candidates A and B are polarized
when their opinion profiles have the following property for any two voters vi
and vj : if vi evaluates A higher (respectively, lower) than B then vi evaluates
B no higher (respectively, no lower) than vj . When an electorate is polarized
17
there can be no consensus so the “strongly for or against” characteristic of MR
renders the only acceptable result.
17Polarization evokes the single crossing opinion profile of the traditional theory [7, 33].
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12.48% 16.15% 3.12% 7.87% 5.43% 5.70% 5.97%
Hollande: Outs. Exc. V.Good V.Good V.Good Good Good
Sarkozy: Rej. Rej. Rej. Poor Fair Fair Good
5.02% 9.77% 6.51% 7.74% 4.61% 9.63%
Hollande: Fair Fair Poor. Poor Rej. Rej.
Sarkozy: Good V.Good V.Good Exc. Exc. Outs.
Table 3c. Polarized opinion profile, Hollande-Sarkozy, 2012 French presidential
election poll (for merit profile of Table 3a).
Theorem 1 ([6]) Majority rule (MR) avoids the domination paradox on pairs
of candidates that are polarized.
The polarized Hollande-Sarkozy opinion profile with the same merit profile
as Table 3a is given in Table 3c and the polarized Clinton-Trump opinion profile
with the same merit profile as Table 4a is given in Table 4c. The polarized opin-
ion profile makes Hollande the MR-winner with a score of 50.75% to Sarkozy’s
43.28%. Similarly, the polarized profile makes Clinton the MR-winner with 55%
to Trump’s 43%. With these opinion profiles MR makes the right decisions.
9% 26% 11% 9% 2%
Clinton: Great Good Average Average Poor
Trump: Terrible Terrible Terrible Poor Poor
9% 7% 18% 9%
Clinton: Poor Terrible Terrible Terrible
Trump: Average Average Good Great
Table 4c. Polarized opinion profile, Clinton-Trump, 2016 US presidential
election poll, Pew Research Center (for merit profile of Table 4a).
A method of ranking  is consistent with MR on polarized pairs of candidates
if both give the identical ranking between every such pair.
Theorem 2 ([6]) A method of ranking that is consistent with MR on polarized
pairs (and enjoys several standard properties) must coincide with the MG-rule.
Since MR is strategy-proof this means the MG-rule shares that property on
polarized pairs. It may be shown that MG is the unique method that is strategy-
proof (enjoying several standard properties) on this domain. Since MG is MJ
when there are many voters this may be said of MJ.
AV, however, is not consistent with MR on polarized pairs. Take, for ex-
ample, the 2012 French presidential poll (Table 9a). AV with Approve meaning
Good or better elects Le Pen with a score of 32.16% to Poutou’s 13.71%. The
polarized opinion profile of Le Pen vs. Poutou is given in Table 9d. With it
Poutou is the MR-winner with 47.63% of the votes to Le Pen’s 46.14%, 6.24%
voting for neither (the total of 100.01% is due to round-off error).
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0.14% 1.36% 4.48% 7.73% 12.48% 21.44% 6.24%
Poutou: Outs. Exc. V.Good Good Fair Poor Poor
Le Pen: Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej. Poor
0.41% 13.57% 9.36% 9.50% 7.33% 5.97%
Poutou: Poor Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej. Rej.
Le Pen: Fair Fair Good V.Good Exc. Outs.
Table 9d. Polarized opinion profile, Le Pen-Poutou, 2012 French presidential
election poll (for merit profile of Table 4a).
Nor are point-summing methods consistent with MR on polarized pairs. If
Outstanding is worth 6 points, Excellent 5, . . . , down to To Reject 0, Le Pen’s
172.75 points easily defeats Poutou’s 101.80.
To conclude, MJ is the unique method that is Condorcet-consistent on polar-
ized pairs—where MR works well—and always avoids the domination paradox.
3.3 The no-show paradox and syndrome
Let candidate A’s grades be α = {α1, . . . , αn} and B’s be β = {β1, . . . , βn},
both written as usual in non-increasing order; and take An and Bn to mean
those candidates with those n grades.
A method of ranking R is subject to the no-show paradox if An R
Bn, one more voter arrives who evaluates A higher than B, αn+1 
βn+1, yet B
n+1 R An+1.
Majority judgment admits the no-show paradox (as was pointed out in [2],
p. 286) and is easily illustrated. Take the example of section 3.1 but as a merit
profile, so that MJ places A above B, and suppose a new voter arrives, rating
A Fair and B Poor, so preferring A to B. This gives the merit profile:
A: Very Good Very Good [ Very Good Fair ] Fair Fair
B: Excellent Excellent [ Good Good ] Good Poor
where B’s middlemost block where they differ is more consensual than A’s, so
MJ places B above A. This occurs because of a gap in A’s grades at the precise
point that causes a reversal, a highly unlikely event in an election with many
voters. However, if the new voter strongly preferred A to B, then the no-show
paradox does not occur. For example, if the new voter evaluated A Excellent
and B Good, the merit profile becomes:
A: Excellent Very Good [ Very Good Very Good ] Fair Fair
B: Excellent Excellent [ Good Good ] Good Good
A’s middlemost block dominates B’s so MJ places A above B: no no-show
paradox.
In general, take a merit profile for which An MJ Bn because the extremities
of the middlemost blocks where they differ are [α, α] 6= [β, β]. Suppose an
(n+ 1)st voter arrives who evaluates A higher than B, αn+1  βn+1.
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Theorem 3 The no-show paradox cannot occur with majority judgment when
αn+1  max{α, β} and βn+1  min{α, β}.
The no-show paradox cannot occur when (as in the example) the (n+1)st voter
sees a real difference between the candidates. It can only occur when that voter
either (1) has a relatively good opinion of both candidates (αn+1  βn+1 
min{α, β}) and B’s evaluation increases, or (2) a relatively bad opinion of both
candidates (βn+1 ≺ αn+1 ≺ max{α, β}) and A’s evaluation decreases. However,
for the paradox to exist at all it must be assumed that the voter cares more about
the victor than about increasing B’s evaluation in the first case or decreasing
A’s evaluation in the second case.18 This assumption is not verified in practice:
voters’ utilities are unknown and unfathomable (as is further discussed in the
conclusions below).
Proof. To begin suppose n is odd and that the first middlemost where A’s
and B’s grades differ is the 1st-middlemost. They are singletons, the candidates’
majority grades: αA and βB with αA  αB . Take αn+1 = αA and βn+1 = βB .
Then n + 1 is even and the first middlemost interval where An+1 and Bn+1
differ is [αA, αA] 6= [βB , βB ], so An+1 MJ Bn+1. The monotonicity of majority
judgment implies that An+1 MJ Bn+1 when αn+1 is raised or βn+1 lowered,
so An+1 MJ Bn+1 for any αn+1  αA and βn+1  βB .
So suppose the first middlemost where A’s and B’s grades differ is not a
singleton. Recall that in An and Bn the middlemost grades strictly within
[α, α] (to the right of α and the left of α) and the corresponding set strictly
within [β, β] are identical or void. An MJ Bn because either (i) α  β and
α  β with one comparison strict, or (ii) β  α  α  β.
Case (i). Take any pair αn+1  βn+1 satisfying α  αn+1  max{α, β} =
α and β  βn+1  min{α, β} = β. Such pairs exist, e.g., αn+1 = α and
βn+1 = β. Place αn+1 within the interval [α, α] and βn+1 within the interval
[β, β] thereby satisfying the property that from left to right the grades are non-
increasing. The intervals [α, α] 6= [β, β] remain middlemost intervals since in
An+1 and Bn+1 the number of grades to their left equals the number of grades
to their right. The middlemost grades strictly within [α, α] (excluding α, α)
dominate the corresponding grades strictly within [β, β], so An+1 MJ Bn+1.
The monotonicity of majority judgment implies that An+1 MJ Bn+1 for any
αn+1  max{α, β}, βn+1  min{α, β} and αn+1  βn+1.
Case (ii). Take any pair αn+1  βn+1 satisfying α  αn+1  max{α, β} = α
and β  βn+1  min{α, β} = α. Such pairs exist, e.g., αn+1 = βn+1 = α.
Place αn+1 within the interval [α, α] and βn+1 within the interval [β, β]. The
intervals [α, α] 6= [β, β] remain middlemost intervals in An+1 and Bn+1. If
αn+1  βn+1 then, as in case (i), the grades strictly within the interval [α, α]
dominate those strictly within [β, β], so An+1 MJ Bn+1. If αn+1 = βn+1 then
[α, α] 6= [β, β] are the first middlemost intervals where the grades of An+1 and
18In the toy-example used to display the paradox the new voter who rates A Fair and B
Poor may be contented having brought down A’s evaluation from [Very Good ] to [Very Good,
Fair ]: who knows?
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Bn+1 differ, so An+1 MJ Bn+1. The monotonicity of majority judgment again
implies that An+1 MJ Bn+1 for any αn+1  max{α, β}, βn+1  min{α, β}
and αn+1  βn+1.
Theorem 4 Majority judgment with three grades excludes the no-show paradox.
Proof. Take the three grades from highest to lowest to be 2, 1, and 0.
Suppose (as above) that An MJ Bn, the first middlemost intervals of An and
Bn where their grades differ is [α, α] 6= [β, β], and an (n+1)st voter arrives who
evaluates A higher than B, αn+1  βn+1.
If n is odd and the first middlemost where A’s and B’s grades differ is the
1st-middlemost, then as was seen they are the candidates’ majority grades:
αA and βB with αA  αB . By Theorem 1 there are only two possibilities
where the paradox could occur, namely, when (i) βn+1 ≺ αn+1 ≺ αA or (ii)
αn+1  βn+1  βB .
In the first case three grades implies βn+1 = 0, αn+1 = 1, and αA = 2.
Consider the worst possible set of evaluations of A and the best of B compatible
with the assumptions:
An :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 · · · 2
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
αA = 2
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn : 2 · · · 2 βB = 1 1 · · · 1
The (n+ 1)st voter’s grades yields
An+1 :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 · · · 2
2︷︸︸︷
2 1
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0 0
Bn+1 : 2 · · · 2 1 1 1 · · · 1 0
so An+1 MJ Bn+1 since A’s two middlemost grades dominates B’s. Thus the
no-show paradox does not occur in this most vulnerable of possibilities. The
monotonicity of majority judgment then proves that it cannot occur at all.
In the second case αn+1 = 2, βn+1 = 1, and βB = 0. The worst possible
evaluations of A and best of B compatible with the assumptions are:
An :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[αA = 1]
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn : 2 · · · 2 [βB = 0] 0 · · · 0
The late voter’s grades yields
An+1 :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 1 · · · 1
2︷︸︸︷
1 1
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn+1 : 2 2 · · · 2 1 0 0 · · · 0
so again An+1 MJ Bn+1 and the monotonicity of majority judgment assures
that the paradox can never occur.
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So suppose the first middlemost where A’s and B’s grades differ is not a
singleton. As before, there are but two possibilities for the no-show paradox to
arise: either (i) βn+1 ≺ αn+1 ≺ max{α, β} or (ii) αn+1  βn+1  min{α, β}.
Consider the first case. As was noted before (1) implies α  β, so with only
three grades, βn+1 = 0, αn+1 = 1, and α = 2. Therefore α = 2, and β ≺ 2
(β = 2 would contradict the hypothesis). The worst possible set of evaluations
of A and the best of B compatible with the assumptions are
An :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 · · · 2
l≥2︷ ︸︸ ︷
α = 2 · · · 2 α = 2
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn : 2 · · · 2 β = 2 · · · 2 β = 1 1 · · · 1
Adjoining the late voter’s grades yields
An+1 :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 · · · 2
l+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 · · · 2 2 1
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0 0
Bn+1 : 2 · · · 2 2 · · · 2 1 1 1 · · · 1 0
where the l + 1 middlemost grades of A dominate the corresponding set of
B, showing An+1 MJ Bn+1. The monotonicity of MJ proves the no-show
paradox cannot occur.
Consider, finally, the second case. With three grades αn+1  βn+1 
min{α, β} implies αn+1 = 2, βn+1 = 1, and β = 0 (α cannot be 0 since
An MJ Bn). The worst possible set of evaluations of A and the best of B
compatible with the assumptions are
An :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1
l≥2︷ ︸︸ ︷
α = 1 0 · · · 0 α = 0
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn : 2 · · · 2 β = 0 0 · · · 0 β = 0 0 · · · 0
When the (n+ 1)st voter adds her votes the grades become
An+1 :
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 1 · · · 1
l+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 1 0 · · · 0
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
Bn+1 : 2 2 · · · 2 1 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
A’s l + 1 middlemost grades dominate B’s, so An+1 MJ Bn+1. The mono-
tonicity of MJ establishes the result once more. Thus in all cases the no-show
paradox cannot occur.
There is a more general concept than the no-show paradox that encapsulates
the same general idea: not only more support can hurt a candidate but also more
support that could be decisive is not decisive.
A method of ranking R is subject to the no-show syndrome if An R
Bn, one more voter arrives who prefers A to B, αn+1  βn+1, yet
Bn+1 R An+1.
AV is subject to the no-show syndrome (as is MJ). Suppose Approve means
Very Good or better with the merit profile
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A: Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor
B: Very Good Very Good Fair Poor Poor
AV proclaims a tie vote, each candidate receiving two ticks (though A’s grades
dominate B’s). One more voter arrives who evaluates A Good and B Fair or
A Excellent and B Very Good : the vote remains an AV tie. In this case MJ
places A ahead of B before and after a sixth voter. Of course this example is in
essence the same as that showing MJ admits the no-show paradox: if the late
voter sees a real difference between the two candidates—in the MJ case giving
A at least Good and B at most Fair (see Theorem 1), in the AV case giving A
a tick and not B—then the no-show syndrome does not occur.
It may be argued that the likelihood for an AV tie in an election with many
voters is infinitesimal: true enough, but a late MJ voter is even more rarely in
the position of being able to provoke the no-show syndrome or paradox. In the
uses and experiments reported on above AV produces ties or near ties whereas
MJ does not (unless two candidates have precisely the same set of grades): with
few voters AV produces two ties in the Louis Lyons jury; with many voters, AV
produces a tie in the Paris-Diderot vote, a near tie in the Alfortville Socialist
primary (53.2% for Valls, 53.5% for Royal).19
AV is subject to another allied property. A method R is insensitive if Bn R
An, an arbitrarily large set of n′ voters arrive who all have the same opinion—
they give A the grade α and B the grade β with α  β—yet Bn+n′ R An+n′ .
It is evident that AV is insensitive for the simple reason that two grades do
not suffice. It occurs when voters see a difference between the two candidates
but cannot express it since they either Approve both or Disapprove both. Insen-
sitivity decreases as the number of grades increases: MJ with sufficiently many
grades is sensitive.
AV supporters claim, “By being better able to express their preferences,
voters would probably be more likely to go to the polls . . . ” ([14] p. 4). There
can be no doubt that with a language of six or seven grades voters are able to
express their preferences better than with two grades. But more is true. With
AV a voter who Approves both candidates or Disapproves both candidates has
no effect on the outcome, so she might as well stay home instead of bothering
to vote. With MJ even a voter who gives the same grade to A and B can (in
theory) change the outcome. For example, take the following merit profile where
the MJ-winner is A:
A: Very Good Very Good Very Good Fair Fair
B: Excellent Excellent Good Good Good
A voter who gives both To Reject makes B the MJ-winner. Thus with MJ
every voter has the potential to change the outcome. Moreover, many who are
opposed to all (or all important) candidates do not vote or cast blank ballots;
19In experiments comparing methods with 101 ballots AV produced more ties than any of
the methods used [2], p. 343.
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with MJ they would be incited to participate if only to attribute a To Reject to
all: were all candidates to have To Reject majority-grades there would be little
else to do than hold another election with different candidates (a remark that
is all the more significant when there is only one candidate).
3.4 Majority judgment with three grades
Majority judgment with only three grades (MJ3)—say, Approve, Neither (Ap-
prove or Disapprove), Disapprove; or Competent, Harmless, Incompetent—is
particularly simple. First, the ballot can be simplified by asking voters to ei-
ther Approve or Disapprove or do neither which would mean Neither (e.g., Pew
Research Center’s presidential approval ratings [30]).
Second, the calculation can be simplified. Let a candidate A’s percent (or
number) of Approves be a+ and percent (or number) of Disapproves be a−.
A’s percent of Neithers is then a0 = (100 − a+ − a−)%. Define the score of a
candidate A with grades (a+, a0, a−) to be
sc(A) =
{
a+ when a+ > a−, and
−a− when a+ ≤ a−,
in which case the MJ3 ranking is
A MJ3 B when
{
sc(A) > sc(B) or
sc(A) = sc(B), and a+ − a− > b+ − b−.
The second condition says the scores are the same and A’s grades dominate B’s.
A simple examination of all possibilities proves this is the MJ-ranking.
The Doctoral Council of the Universite´ Paris-Dauphine used MJ3 in the
early summer of 2015. It had one, possibly two, extra fellowships to award and
three candidates, one in computer sciences Sc, one in economics Se, and one in
mathematics Sm. Sixteen members J1, . . . , J16 of the Council voted. In keeping
with an often used scheme for classifying students in France, the scale of grades
used was A (highest), B, and C (lowest). The opinion profile is in Table 12a, the
merit profile in Table 12b (the majority-grades are added but are unnecessary
to determine the MJ3-ranking).
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8
Se B A A A A A A B
Sm B C B B A A C A
Sc A C C A C B B C
J9 J10 J11 J12 J13 J14 J15 J16
Se A B A B A B C C
Sm C A C C B C A A
Sc C C B A A A C C
Table 12a. Opinion profile, extra fellowship, Doctoral Council, Universite´
Paris-Dauphine, summer 2015.
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Grades: A B C MJ3 scores Majority-grade
Se 9 5 2 +9 A
Sm 6 4 6 −6 B
Sc 5 3 8 −8 C
Table 12b. Merit profile, extra fellowship, Doctoral Council, Universite´
Paris-Dauphine, summer 2015.
Se dominates Sm which in turn dominates Sc. It is worth noting that this
was not an experiment: it was an academic exercise involving the usual stiff
competition among disciplines. Nevertheless—despite oft repeated predictions
that when the stakes are high voters will use only the highest and lowest grades—
voters did not confine themselves to A’s and C’s: 12 B’s were given (together
with 20 A’s and 16 C’s). Only five of the 16 voters confined themselves to A’s
and C’s. Moreover, although there were three grades and three candidates, only
six voters rank-ordered them by using all three grades.
As another example take the 2012 French presidential poll (Table 9a), and
suppose that with MJ3 Approve means Very Good or better, Neither means
Good or Fair, and Disapprove means Poor or worse, giving the merit profile
and MJ3 scores in Table 13a.
MJ3-ranking Approve Neither Disapprove MJ3 score Majority-grade
Hollande 45.05% 26.46% 28.49% +45.05 Neither
Bayrou 34.06% 45.32% 20.63% +34.06 Neither
Sarkozy 38.26% 22.12% 39.62% −39.62 Neither
Me´lenchon 27.82% 31.75% 40.43% −40.43 Neither
Le Pen 22.80% 23.34% 53.87% −53.87 Disapprove
Dupont-Aignon 9.09% 31.48% 59.43% −59.43 Disapprove
Joly 10.31% 26.45% 63.22% −63.22 Disapprove
Poutou 5.98% 20.21% 73.82% −73.82 Disapprove
Arthaud 5.16% 19.67% 75.17% −75.17 Disapprove
Cheminade 3.66% 17.50% 78.84% −78.84 Disapprove
Table 13a. Merit profile three grades, MJ3-scores, 2012 French presidential
poll (737 ballots).
Five different methods’ rankings are given in Table 13b. The rankings all
differ. In 34 of the 45 pairs of candidates one’s grades dominates the other’s.
The MJ3-ranking and all three AV-rankings place Le Pen in 5th place, ignoring
the detailed information that places her in 8th place when all the nuances in
opinion are taken into account. Three grades in this case do not reflect the fact
that of Le Pen’s 53.87% Disapprove, fully 47.63% are To Reject.
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AV AV AV
MJ MJ3 Exc. Very Good Good
Hollande 1 1 1 1 2
Bayrou 2 2 3 3 1
Sarkozy 3 3 2 2 3
Me´lenchon 4 4 4 4 4
Dupont-Aignan 5 6 6 7 7
Joly 6 7 7 6 6
Poutou 7 8 8 8 8
Le Pen 8 5 5 5 5
Arthaud 9 9 9 9 9
Cheminade 10 10 10 10 10
Table 13b. Several rankings, 2012 French presidential poll (737 ballots).
In sum, those AV-enthusiasts who lend a primary importance to the no-show
paradox can improve matters by using three grades rather than two, thus giving
up AV and using MJ3: two grades do not suffice. It seems three grades meets
their agenda, though three are too few to adequately express voters’ opinions
in most applications.20
4 Conclusion
Why do voters bother to vote? Few believe that his or her vote in a national
contest will change the outcome so “rational” behavior would lead them to
abstain. Those voters who go to the polls do so for many reasons: to express
their beliefs by giving their opinions (to the extent that the electoral system
allows), to participate, to feel they belong to the society in which they live, to
be “counted,” . . . .
Much of the traditional theory of voting takes a considerably more limited
view; namely, that voters care only about who wins an election. It assumes, in
the jargon of economic theory, that a voter’s utility function depends only on
the identity of the winner. With this view the extent of the victory, the identity
of the runner-up, the place of each candidate in the final standings, and the
extent of the support for them, all have nothing to do with voters’ wishes.
In fact nothing is known about voters’ wishes and satisfactions—as many
elections show—so in a more realistic context “no-show” may be no paradox in
theory as well as in practice.
The 2002 AV experiment in Orsay (section 2.2) and polls and experiments
with MJ [2, 3] show voters’ preferences cannot be explained as single-peaked on
a left-to-right political spectrum (although statistically they can be). In theory
20Point-summing methods have been characterized as the only methods that avoid the no-
show paradox and several other standard properties; however, they should certainly not be
used: they are meaningless according to measurement theory and the most manipulable of all
methods (see [2]), Chpts. 17 and 19).
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single-peakedness is very unlikely [22]. A recent study of voting in Switzer-
land uses principal component analysis to show that at least three dimensions
are necessary to map voters’ preferences, so the one-dimensional single-peaked
condition cannot be met [17].
The 2017 French presidential election shows voters’ motivations are far from
being limited to the identity of the winner. A first round with 11 candidates,
77.8% of registered voters participating, and 2.6% blank or invalid ballots re-
sulted in four leading candidates: Jean-Luc Me´lenchon (far left) 19.58%, Em-
manuel Macron (center) 24.01%, Franc¸ois Fillon (right) 20.01%, and Marine Le
Pen (extreme right) 21.03%. The second round was between Macron and Le
Pen—two very distinct, fundamentally opposed candidates—and yet only 74.6%
of the voters turned out, and of all ballots cast fully 11.5% were blank or invalid.
Thus 1,536,201 fewer voters participated in the run-off, and of the 35,467,327
who participated 4,085,724 cast blank or invalid ballots: fully 5,622,125 did not
wish to chose one or the other candidate in this battle of strongly opposed ide-
ologies, policies, and persons. Many of these voters had voted for Me´lenchon or
the socialist candidate Benoit Hamon in the first round: they preferred having
no voice in the choice of president to giving their vote to a candidate whose
ideology was very different than theirs. By preventing them from expressing
themselves MR simply disenfranchised them, as would AV as well. The out-
come was Macron 66.1%, Le Pen 33.9%: Macron’s crushing victory in no way
reflected the preference of the electorate for him; instead it expressed the elec-
torate’s negative opinion of Le Pen.
A recent study of French parliamentary (1978-2012) and local (2011, 2015)
elections also concludes that voters do not care only about who wins. It makes a
distinction between “expressive” voters who vote according to their preferences
among candidates only and “instrumentally rational” or “strategic” voters who
vote based on the likely winners. Their data base leads them to conclude “that
a large fraction of voters are . . . ‘expressive’ and vote for their favorite candidate
at the cost of causing the defeat of their second-best choice” ([32], p. 42).
In addition to showing what is no more than common sense—that voters
must be given the means to express their opinions—this paper has presented
evidence—experimental and theoretical—to make a number of key points.
1. MR can easily go astray because voters’ opinions cannot be adequately
expressed.
2. The two grades or multiple ticks of AV are insufficient expressions of vot-
ers’ opinions as well.
3. AV’s Approve is not in practice the complement of Disapprove (so two
grades are too few).
4. The no-show paradox—a theoretical possibility with MJ—is insignificant
because so unlikely to occur in practice.
5. The no-show paradox is impossible when MJ has three grades.
33
6. Neither MJ nor AV is Condorcet-consistent when votes are honest, which
is a good property of both [6].
7. MJ is consistent with MR on polarized pairs of candidates so resists strate-
gic manipulation on that domain when the grades are sufficiently rich21,
not true of AV (nor of point-summing methods).
8. In practice voters and judges using MJ do not limit themselves to highest
and lowest grades (if they did the results would be those of AV).
9. In practice voters and judges have no difficulty in assigning grades [26].
Experience suggests it is cognitively natural to do so (as versus rank-
ing candidates or partitioning them into two classes). This is shown by
repeated experimentation, MJ’s increased use in various instances, includ-
ing French and American national polls [30], French news sites on the web
[34, 38], a grass-roots citizen’s primary conducted in France [23]; and plain
common sense.
In short, MJ with six or seven grades (and even with three grades) has
striking advantages over AV.
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